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Abstract We integrate a banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic frame-
work, which then provides new insights on developments around the Global Financial
Crisis. The analysis shows that growth of banking sector money supply may help
explain the secular decline in long-term interest rates before the crisis. A new bank
funding channel of monetary transmission clarifies why increases in central bank pol-
icy rates could not reverse this trend. Our analysis highlights the distinction between
the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap, and shows that bank recapitalizations can
be more effective than fiscal expansions in restoring aggregate demand after a banking
crisis.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, academics and policy makers acknowl-
edged the need to better understand the role of banks in the macro-economy. Since then,
a large literature has emerged shedding light on this topic. What has not yet emerged,
however, is a descriptive analytical framework that is intelligible to a broader audi-
ence of academics, informed policy makers, and students alike. By developing such
a framework we aim to fill this gap. Our framework contributes to economic policy
making, as the debate on, for instance, bank regulation and banking crisis manage-
ment is not the domain of macroeconomic theorists alone, but requires achieving an
understanding between a wide audience of policy makers, politicians, public opinion
leaders, and the electorate.1 In addition, our framework contributes to the academic
debate by shedding new light on key developments around the Global Financial Crisis
and the ensuing recession.
A key building block of our model is the banking sector, which intermediates funds
between savers and investors and is based on Van den Heuvel (2008). Our model not
only incorporates banks’ role as suppliers of credit, as most macroeconomic models
with banks, but also accounts for their role as suppliers of money (i.e., liquidity).
In particular, banks provide money to savers by issuing short-term deposits, while
they provide credit to investors by making long-term loans. In doing so, banks use
short-term debt liabilities to finance long-term assets, while they are constrained by
a minimum equity requirement. This requirement imposes banks to fund a minimum
percentage of loans with equity, thereby limiting their leverage. As bank equity is
fixed in the short run (Adrian and Shin 2011), it constrains the supply of money (e.g.,
Diamond and Rajan 2000; Van den Heuvel 2008) as well as the supply of credit (e.g.,
Van den Heuvel 2002; Woodford 2010).
To integrate the banking sector into an accessible macroeconomic framework we
turn to the aggregate demand set-up initiated by Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1937),
which was recently micro-founded by Michaillat and Saez (2014). This choice of
model is not a coincidence: its ease of use leads Krugman (2000) to consider this
framework as “superior for many practical applications”. At the outset of the crisis,
Mankiw (2006) describes this set-up as “the basic framework that modern students
1 Rochet (2015) argues that “although many economists have tried to introduce banks and financial frictions
into DSGE models, these models are too complicated with so many interacting ‘blocks’ (to reproduce data
in the short term), that by adding another layer of complexity they lose transparency and the possibility to
interpret the results”. While this complexity is to some extent inevitable when going beyond the descriptive
level, it may also explain the observation by Grauwe (2010) that, once the crisis broke out, policy makers
“did not ask the advice of [those] who knew how to solve complex DSGE models,” but “went straight back
to the things that were taught in macroeconomic textbooks of 40 years ago […] and massively increased
budget deficits and flooded the money markets with hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity”.
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learn to make sense of the business cycle”, while Woodford (2010) uses it to convey
the implications of the crisis for macroeconomic analysis. Most recently, Blanchard
(2016) explains to “strongly believe that ad hoc macro models, from various versions
of the IS–LM to the Mundell–Fleming model, have an important role to play in relation
to DSGE models. They can be useful upstream, before DSGE modeling, as a first cut
to think about the effects of a particular distortion or a particular policy. They can be
useful downstream, after DSGE modeling, to present the major insight of the model
in a lighter and pedagogical fashion”.2 For our purpose, a particular advantage of
the aggregate demand model is that it allows us to straightforwardly incorporate the
distinction between money and capital market interest rates and between banks’ roles
as suppliers of money and credit. Coincidentally, these modifications also address
some of the main caveats of the model raised by Blinder (1997) and Romer (2000),
with the latter’s IS–MP model being a special case of our approach.3
In short, our model can be described as follows. Money is supplied by banks rather
than by the central bank, and is determined by the amount of bank equity in combination
with a binding equity requirement. Demand for money is driven by a transaction motive
that depends on aggregate demand and a speculative motive that depends on the spread
between the long-term and the short-term interest rate. With the short-term interest
rate being set by the central bank to conduct monetary policy, the money market
equilibrium is described by all combinations of aggregate demand and the long-term
interest that equate the supply and demand for money—the LM-curve. On the capital
market (i.e., the market for bank loans), a weighted average of short-term and long-term
interest rates determines the return on savings and investments. The capital market is
in equilibrium for all combinations of aggregate demand and the long-term interest
rate that equate the supply and demand for capital—the IS-curve. The demand-side
equilibrium is then described by the simultaneous equilibrium of the money and capital
market. Hence, in equilibrium, aggregate demand and the long-term interest rate are
endogenously determined by, amongst others, the central bank’s short-term interest
rate and the supply of money generated by the banking sector.
In addition to being easy to use, our model sheds new light on key developments
observed around the 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the ensuing recession. Four
findings stand out in particular. First, our model suggests that part of the secular
decline in the long-term interest rate prior to the crisis may have been driven by an
increase in banking sector money supply. Usually, the downward trend in long-term
interest rates is attributed to a global ‘savings glut’ stemming from an increasing sup-
ply of savings relative to investment demand (e.g., Bernanke 2005; Greenspan 2010;
IMF 2014). Our framework can incorporate this development through an increase
of the savings rate, but in addition highlights a role for the growing supply of bank
2 This point is developed in more detail in the recent Special Issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Rebuilding Macroeconomic Theory (Vines and Wills 2018) in which, among others, Wren-Lewis (2018),
Blanchard (2018), Stiglitz (2018) and Krugman (2018) discuss the future (and past) of macroeconomic
models.
3 While abstracting from the role of banks, Lukkezen et al. (2015) use the IS–MP model to study fiscal
and monetary policy effectiveness when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound and when firms are
recovering from balance sheet problems.
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money made possible by rising bank equity values. Between 2000 and mid-2007,
these equity values outperformed the stock market by as much as 50% points. In the
model, this enables banks to substantially increase the supply of money, for instance
through increasing their supply of liquid asset backed securities as witnessed during
the pre-crisis years. Just as in the standard model, and irrespective of the effects of a
rising savings rate, such an increase in the money supply lowers the long-term interest
rate.
Second, our model suggests a new monetary transmission channel which may
explain the ‘interest rate conundrum’ first pointed out by Greenspan (2005). This
conundrum describes the apparent unresponsiveness of the long-term interest rate to
changes in the short-term interest rate. As a result, central banks’ pre-crisis attempts to
raise long-term interest rates through monetary tightening proved largely ineffective.
Our model accounts for this inability by showing that monetary policy directly affects
both the money and the capital market (i.e., it also shifts the IS-curve). Consider, for
instance, a monetary tightening through an increase in the short-term interest rate. It
is well known that this stimulates money demand and thereby causes the long-term
interest rate to rise. However, in our model also the capital market is directly affected
because banks pass on their higher short-term funding costs to their borrowers, who
react by lowering investment spending. This second mechanism renders the overall
impact of monetary policy on the long-term interest rate ambiguous. We refer to this
mechanism as the bank funding channel of monetary transmission, and note that it
complements the interest rate, bank lending (Bernanke and Blinder 1988), and bank
capital channel of monetary policy transmission (Van den Heuvel 2002).
Third, our model highlights that a bank recapitalization can be a particularly pow-
erful policy instrument to restore aggregate demand in the wake of a banking crisis,
even when this recapitalization is financed with a tax increase rather than through
deficit spending. In fact, the model allows us to derive a bank equity multiplier that
is reminiscent of the government spending multiplier. Comparing the two reveals that
the former is generally larger than the latter. Comparatively small changes in bank
equity can therefore have large effects on aggregate demand, in line with the large
decline in economic activity observed after the Global Financial Crisis. While part of
this decline has been attributed to fiscal consolidation policies adopted after the crisis,
the fact that 2015 bank equity values were still 46% below their pre-crisis level may
thus have played a role as well.
Finally, by taking into account that the short-term interest rate is controlled by
the central bank while the banking sector supplies the quantity of money, our model
highlights the underappreciated difference between the zero lower bound and the
liquidity trap. While the two are often seen as part and parcel (e.g., Krugman 1998;
Eggertsson 2008), we show that both have substantially different implications for
policy effectiveness. The zero lower bound involves the case where a conventional
monetary expansion is no longer feasible because the short-term policy interest rate
cannot decline below zero. The liquidity trap, by contrast, can also occur when interest
rates are higher than zero. It involves the case where an increase in banking sector
money supply can no longer reduce the long-term interest rate because this rate would
then have to decline below the short-term one. The zero lower bound thus constrains
the short-term interest rate while the liquidity trap constrains the long-term one. While
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being in a liquidity trap limits the impact of bank money supply on aggregate demand,
it increases the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy. The classic result that
monetary policy is ineffective in a liquidity trap thus disappears once taking into
account that central banks do not control the supply of money, but instead target the
short-term interest rate.
The analysis of the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap also illustrates that the
traditional aggregate demand framework and Romer’s (2000) IS–MP model both are
special cases of our approach. More specifically, the traditional framework is obtained
when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound, while the IS–MP framework is
obtained when the economy is in a liquidity trap. While improving upon both models,
our exercise thus shows how both are related as special cases of a more general
approach. In an extension of our framework, we show that the banking sector’s supply
of money can be endogenized without materially affecting the model’s comparative
statics or the insights it generates. One advantage of endogenizing the money supply
is that the analysis no longer relies on the assumption of a constant price level, which
in the standard model is used to deflate the nominal money stock. A shortcoming
that the model inherits from the traditional framework, however, is the absence of a
mechanism for the formation of expectations, but this caveat seems hard to overcome
without compromising the model’s tractability.
Our analysis may also benefit future research on banking and the macro-economy
that aims to go beyond the descriptive level. Recent contributions to this literature
include Gerali et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler et al. (2012), Clerc
et al. (2014) and Boissay et al. (2015). These studies focus on the role of banks
in supplying credit to the real economy but do not incorporate their role as sup-
pliers of money. This omission may stem from the belief discussed by Woodford
(2010) that central banks can easily offset a decline in bank money supply by increas-
ing the provision of reserves to the banking sector. But as the model by Van den
Heuvel (2008) and the present analysis illustrate, a decline in bank equity reduces
money supply even if banks are not required to hold reserves in the first place.
Belongia and Ireland (2006) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) incorporate a
role for bank money supply, albeit without allowing a role for bank equity. Mor-
eira and Savov (2014) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015) recently highlight
the key role of financial intermediaries as suppliers of money to the real economy.
Inspired by these contributions, we hope that our paper may assist both schol-
ars and policy makers in exploring the interaction between banking and aggregate
demand.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In the next section we incorpo-
rate a banking sector in a descriptive model of aggregate demand and characterize
its equilibrium. In Sect. 3 we illustrate the model’s properties by analyzing the
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role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy, the impact of changes in
bank equity on aggregate demand, and the difference between the zero lower bound
and the liquidity trap. Section 4 applies the model to the 2007 Global Financial
Crisis, while the final section concludes. The “Appendix” collects some addi-
tional comparative static results such as the effects of an increase in government
spending.
2 The Model
Taking the original aggregate demand model as a starting point we use this section to
extend the model with a banking sector based on Van den Heuvel (2008). Essentially,
our model differs from the standard aggregate demand model in two respects. First,
money is supplied by the banking sector and not by the central bank. Second, the
central bank performs monetary policy through adjustments of the short-term interest
rate instead of by setting the supply of money. To keep the model tractable we focus
on linear functional forms.
2.1 The Banking Sector
We display the balance sheet of the aggregate banking sector, in stylized form, in
Fig. 1. The asset side of the balance sheet is composed of long-term loans L while the
liability side is equally stylized and consists of short-term debt liabilities D—referred
to as ‘deposits’—and shareholder equity E .
For the purpose of our analysis the three items in Fig. 1 cover the main characteristics
of the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector. On the asset side, loans are risky
and illiquid and yield the bank lending rate rb, see below. On the liability side, what
we refer to as deposits can consist of any form of liquid financing. This includes
immediately redeemable retail deposit funding, but also, for instance, liquid asset
backed debt securities that banks issued to financial market participants. Furthermore,
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the market value of bank equity entails the buffer with which banks can absorb losses on
their asset portfolio.4 The balance sheet can be summarized in the following identity:
L ≡ D + E . (1)
In structuring their balance sheets, banks are constrained by a minimum equity
requirement. This requirement has banks fund at least a share k ∈ (0, 1) of total assets
with equity so that losses on their assets are absorbed by bank shareholders rather than
by bank depositors. The bank equity requirement can be interpreted as the regulatory
requirement set by the bank regulator, or it can be seen as the outcome of market
discipline forces. In that case, the requirement reflects the minimum amount of equity
that banks need to have in order to ensure depositors that their deposits are safe, so as
to prevent them from starting a bank run. As in the absence of such a requirement—
regardless of whether it arises through market discipline or regulation—banks would
finance all their assets with relatively cheaper deposits, the constraint will bind and
total equity equals:
E = kL . (2)
Hence, a higher equity requirement reduces the amount of leverage in the banking
sector.
Combining (1) and (2) provides a straightforward expression linking deposits to
bank equity:
D = m E, with m ≡ 1 − k
k
, (3)
where m can be interpreted as the deposit multiplier of bank equity. For a given value
of E , the amount of deposits decreases if the equity requirement k tightens.5 The
intuition behind this comparative static effect is that higher equity requirements allow
banks to hold fewer assets for a given amount of equity, which through the balance
sheet identity implies they can also have fewer deposits. Hence, as bank equity behaves
as a predetermined variable (see Adrian and Shin 2011), and in line with Diamond and
Rajan (2000) and Van den Heuvel (2008), the total amount of deposits is constrained
by the amount of equity in the banking sector.6
4 Bank equity in the model could also be interpreted in terms of book values rather than market values.
We focus on market values as this is also what banks’ (uninsured) financiers do when determining whether
their claims are safe and liquid. In fact, as shown by Flannery (2015), book value measures of bank equity
are least informative during a crisis, with their stability during the past decade suggesting that there never
was a crisis to begin with.
5 Under the Basel III Accord banks are required to meet a regulatory equity (leverage) requirement of
k = 0.03, leading to a multiplier m of roughly 30. In practice banks may hold a couple of percentage points
of equity in excess of the regulatory requirement, leading to a somewhat lower m.
6 In the long run, bank equity is less likely to be predetermined than in the short run, as banks can increase
their equity by issuing new shares and by retaining earnings while they can reduce their equity by buying back
existing shares and by paying dividends. Section 3.2.1 analyses the case where bank equity is endogenous.
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The objective of the banking sector is to make long-term loans financed with short-
term deposits in such a way as to maximize profits. In particular, banks are price-takers
and maximize profits according to:
 = max
L ,D
(Lrb − Drs − Er − Lrσ )
s.t. L ≡ D + E , E = kL , (4)
where  indicates aggregate profits, rb is the bank lending rate, rs is the risk-free
short-term interest rate, and r denotes the risk-free long-term interest rate. In addition,
rσ denotes a risk-premium that banks pay to their financiers. If the equity requirement
is sufficiently high for deposits to remain risk free, Lrσ goes to bank shareholders so
that the return on equity equals r + LE rσ and the return on deposits equals rs .
Solving (4) yields the following expression for the bank lending rate:
rb = kr + (1 − k)rs + rσ , (5)
with economic profits being equal to zero ( = 0). The rate in (5) is equal to the
one of Van den Heuvel (2008) except that he sets the risk-premium equal to zero.7
As can easily be verified, rb is equal to the bank’s weighted average funding cost.
The ability of banks to fund themselves with deposits thus limits the impact of the
long-term interest rate on the lending rate and funding costs. Indeed, as k is reduced,
rb converges toward rs + rσ , which for a positive interest rate spread, i.e. r > rs ,
implies that rb declines.
2.2 The Money Market
We first consider the role of the banking sector in the money market. In particular,
we take into account that bank deposits constitute the supply of money to the real
economy:
M S = D = m E, (6)
where M S is money supply and we have used (3) to highlight the fact that the amount
of money supplied is determined by the amount of equity in the banking sector. This
observation contrasts with the standard LM-curve in which money supply is deter-
mined by the central bank, but is in line with recent work of McLeay et al. (2014) who
explain that “the majority of money in the modern economy is created by commercial
banks”. Using the discussion surrounding (3) we may also infer that money supply
falls as k increases, which implies that higher equity requirements reduce the supply
of money to the economy.8
7 The remaining difference with Van den Heuvel (2008) is that his model includes a real resource cost
associated with servicing deposits and loans, which we omit for clarity of exposition.
8 Earlier literature has focused on the case where central bank reserves rather than bank equity values
are the binding constraint on bank money supply, so that the central bank can steer the money supply
123
A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate Demand 215
The central bank implements monetary policy by targeting the short-term interest
rate.9 We incorporate this policy instrument in our model by introducing the spread
between the long-term and short-term interest rate in the money demand equation:
M D = dY − e (r − rs) , (7)
where Y is aggregate demand and d ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter reflecting the transaction
motive of money demand. In (7) the dependence of money demand on the interest rate
spread reflects that the opportunity cost from holding liquid short-term over illiquid
long-term assets is equal to the spread between the long-term and short-term inter-
est rate. This difference is expressed in terms of the real interest rate, which is the
same as the spread between nominal interest rates since the spread between inflation
expectations is zero in equilibrium.10
Combining (6) and (7) provides the LM-curve:
Y = e
d
(r − rs) + md E . (8)
Viewing the LM-curve in a (Y, r) space, reveals that changes to either bank equity,
the short-term interest rate or the equity requirement k contained in m can cause the
curve to shift.
2.3 The Capital Market
The supply of capital (i.e., savings) is equal to:
S = (1 − c)Y + f rb, (9)
where c ∈ (0, 1) is the marginal propensity to consume. The parameter f measures
the sensitivity of savings to changes in the return on capital, which is rb as this is
Footnote 8 continued
to the economy by changing the supply of reserves. In practice, however, the reserve requirement has
become obsolete as central banks supply any amount of reserves demanded by the banking sector at the
prevailing policy interest rate (Kydland and Prescott 1990). Consequently, this policy deems the reserve
based ‘money multiplier’ redundant, as is discussed in more detail by Benes and Kumhof (2012). By 2010,
some countries had abolished reserve requirements altogether, including the United Kingdom, Canada,
Denmark, and Sweden (Gray 2011).
9 Briefly speaking, the central bank can control the short-term money market interest rate by announcing
a policy interest rate against which it is willing to lend to and borrow from the banking sector. With this
outside option available, no bank will lend to another bank against an interest rate below this target, and no
bank will borrow from another bank against an interest rate above the target.
10 Blinder (1997) points out that the aggregate demand framework does not distinguish between the short-
term and the long-term interest rate. Romer (2000) highlights that the central bank is assumed to conduct
monetary policy by changing the money supply, whereas in practice it adjusts the short-term nominal
interest rate. In addition, he points out that the model does not distinguish between the nominal interest
rate determining the money market equilibrium and the real interest rate determining the capital market
equilibrium. Our modifications of the money market equilibrium provide a straightforward manner to
address each of these caveats.
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the weighted average return on all deposit and equity holdings in the economy. This
setup generalizes the standard model, which lets the savings function depend on r
as it assumes that all savings earn the long-term interest rate. Instead, we take into
account that a part of savings is held in the form of bank deposits and therefore earns
the short-term interest rate.
Demand for capital (i.e., investments) is given by:
I = iY − brb, (10)
where i ∈ (0, 1) is the marginal propensity to invest and b measures the sensitivity of
firms’ investment demand to changes in the cost of capital, which is the bank lending
rate derived in (5). In contrast to the original model, we take into account that firms do
not borrow against the long-term rate r , but obtain loans from banks whose funding
costs partially depend on the short-term interest rate.
We allow for government deficit spending G in order to compare any consequences
of central bank policy or changes in bank equity with those of fiscal policy. Therefore
aggregate capital demand in the economy is given by: I A = I + G.
Imposing I A = S, substituting (5) and some rewriting yields the IS-curve:
Y = 1
s
(G − (b + f ) (kr + (1 − k) rs + rσ )) , (11)
where we made the standard, though often left implicit, assumption that s ≡ 1−c−i >
0 to ensure that the IS-curve is downward sloping (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer 1989,
p. 530). We notice immediately that the conventional monetary policy instrument (rs)
enters the expression as well. That is, while the capital market equilibrium does not
depend on the supply of money, it does depend on the short-term interest rate. Hence,
by taking into account that banks fund long-term loans with short-term deposits, the
interest rate on which is determined by the central bank interest rate, monetary policy
directly affects both the money market and the capital market.
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is given by the intersection between the IS-curve in (11) and the
LM-curve in (8). At that point both the money and capital market are in equilibrium.
Equating the IS and LM-curve and solving for Y and r , respectively, provides:
Y = e
dk (b + f ) + es
(






dk (b + f ) + es
(
G − (b + f ) (rs + rσ ) − smd E
)
+ rs . (12b)
Viewed through the lens of the expectations hypothesis of interest rates, we note that
the equilibrium value for r in (12b) can be interpreted as the sum of the short-term
interest rate and a term-premium, with an expression for the latter being obtained after
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subtracting rs from both sides of the equation.11 Later on we return to this interpretation
when discussing the liquidity trap. Figure 2 graphically displays the equilibrium of
the model, showing that it consists of a downward sloping IS-curve and an upward
sloping LM-curve.
3 Policy Analysis
Before turning to the Global Financial Crisis in Sect. 4, we use this section to highlight
a number of novel features of our model in isolation. In doing so, as the model is purely
descriptive and abstains from aggregate supply considerations, we avoid any claims
about the optimality of specific economic policies. Instead, we show how the model
establishes a new transmission channel of central bank monetary policy, illustrates
the impact of changes in banking sector money supply when equity values change,
and uncovers the difference between the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap. The
“Appendix” collects some further comparative static effects on fiscal policy, changes
in the risk premium, and changes in bank equity requirements.
3.1 Central Bank Monetary Policy
The impact of a change in the short-term interest rate on aggregate demand can be
obtained by considering the derivative of (12a) with respect to rs :
∂Y
∂rs
= − (b + f )YG = Yrs < 0, (13)
11 The difference between r and rs can also be interpreted as the sum of the term-premium and a liquidity-
premium, where the latter reflects the liquidity services that are associated with holding bank deposits
instead of bank equity. See Hanson et al. (2015) for a recent analysis of how providing such liquidity
services is a key aspect of banks’ business models.
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where YG = edk(b+ f )+es > 0 is the government spending multiplier, which may
be derived from (12a) as is done in the “Appendix”. Yrs is unambiguously negative,
implying that a monetary tightening lowers aggregate demand. The impact of a change
in the short-term interest rate on the long-term interest rate is given by:
∂r
∂rs
= 1 − (b + f )d
e
YG  0, (14)
which can either be positive or negative. Indeed, the impact of rs on r depends crucially
on the relative sensitivities of the LM and IS-curve to changes in rs . If the former is
more sensitive than the latter, implying ed >
1
s
(b + f ) (1 − k), both interest rates will
move in concert, replicating the usual result that a monetary contraction raises the long-
term interest rate.12 If both have the same sensitivity, r is independent of rs . Finally,
if the IS-curve is more sensitive than the LM-curve, there is a negative relationship
between rs and r . Figure 3 displays two alternative IS-curves to illustrate the possible
ways in which an increase in the short-term interest rate can affect aggregate demand
and the long-term interest rate. In both cases the LM-curve and IS-curve shift inward.
However, depending on the magnitude of the shift of the IS-curve, the new long-term
interest rate may be either higher or lower than before.
The limited impact of monetary policy on the long-term interest rate does not imply
that monetary policy is ineffective in changing aggregate demand. On the contrary,
the shift of the IS-curve in Fig. 3 dampens the impact of monetary policy on the
long-term interest rate, but amplifies its impact on aggregate demand. The fact that
monetary policy also affects the capital market equilibrium may help explain the
‘interest rate conundrum’ pointed out by Greenspan (2005) and analyzed by Adrian
et al. (2010). The latter describe how the Federal Reserve raised its policy rate from
12 This condition holds for k = 1 as it then simplifies to ed > 0. However, for the opposite case k = 0, the
condition becomes ed >
b+ f
s , which need not hold in practice.
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1 to 5.25% between June 2004 and June 2006, while the 10-year US Treasury yield
only increased from 4.73 to 5.11%. This limited impact of monetary policy on the
long-term interest rate is hard to account for in the absence of a shift in the IS-curve,
but follows naturally from our model in which monetary policy affects the money
market as well as the capital market.
3.1.1 Monetary Policy Transmission
The impact of monetary policy on the LM-curve in our model is in line with the well-
known interest rate channel of monetary transmission. An increase in the short-term
interest rate increases households’ demand for short-term assets (bank deposits) and
reduces their demand for long-term assets (bank equity), which causes the long-term
interest rate to rise and aggregate demand to fall. However, the empirical literature
reviewed by Peek and Rosengren (2014) indicates that this mechanism creates an
empirical puzzle, as monetary policy shocks that had relatively small effects on the
long-term interest rate appear to have had substantial effects on aggregate demand.13
In order to address this puzzle Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and
Stein (1994) suggest the so-called bank lending channel of monetary policy while Van
den Heuvel (2002) suggests the bank capital (i.e., equity) channel. Under the former,
the central bank tightens monetary policy by reducing the supply of reserves to the
banking sector which causes banks to limit their supply of loans to the economy. Under
the latter, a monetary tightening is effectuated through an increase in the short-term
interest rate, which in turn reduces bank profits and, thereby, the value of their equity.
By means of the equity requirement, banks then need to reduce the amount of loans
provided to the economy. Hence, in both cases, rather than through the money market,
the transmission of a monetary policy contraction is achieved through a reduction in
loans supplied to the economy, which leads to a reduction in aggregate demand.
Supplementing these channels, our model highlights an additional mechanism
through which banking interacts with the transmission of monetary policy. This mech-
anism differs from the aforementioned channels, in that it neither relies on a change
in the supply of central bank reserves (which are absent in the model) nor on a change
in the value of bank equity. In fact, in our model the impact of monetary policy on
the IS-curve in (10) is largest if k = 0. That is, when banks are not required to hold
equity. As a monetary contraction increases banks’ short-term funding costs (which
translates into higher lending rates and lower investment demand), we refer to this
transmission mechanism as the bank funding channel of monetary policy. As the shift
of the IS-curve is larger for lower values of k, we conclude that the ability of banks
to finance long-term loans with short-term deposits amplifies the impact of mone-
tary policy on aggregate demand while dampening—and possibly even reversing—its
impact on the long-term interest rate. Hence, while the bank-funding channel comple-
13 See also Beck et al. (2014) for a recent overview of various monetary transmission channels involving
banks. In addition, Borio and Zhu (2012) highlight how monetary policy can also affect risk-taking in the
economy.
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ments the transmission channels mentioned before, the mechanism behind it is quite
different.14
3.1.2 Inflation and the Taylor Principle
For simplicity, the above exposition assumes that monetary policy targets the short-
term real interest rate, but in practice it targets the nominal one. Both interest rates are
related through the Fisher equation is ≡ rs + πe, where is is the nominal short-term
interest rate and πe denotes expected inflation. Substituting this expression into (12a)
yields:
Y = e
dk (b + f ) + es
(








which implies a positive relationship between aggregate demand and expected inflation
(the comparative statics for is are the same as the ones for rs that were discussed above).
Intuitively, holding the nominal short-term interest rate fixed, higher expected inflation
implies a lower real short-term interest rate, and therefore higher aggregate demand.
In practice, however, the central bank does not keep the nominal short-term interest
rate constant if expected inflation increases. Instead, it responds to expected inflation
according to, for example, is = r∗s +πe +q(πe −π∗), where r∗s denotes the ‘natural’
short-term real interest rate and π∗ denotes the central bank’s inflation objective. For
q > 0, this monetary policy rule is in line with the Taylor principle, which implies
that an increase in expected inflation leads to a higher real short-term interest rate.
Substituting this monetary policy rule in (15a) yields:
Y = e
dk (b + f ) + es
(









which yields the familiar negative relationship between aggregate demand and
expected inflation.15 Figure 4 displays the relationship between aggregate demand
and expected inflation that is implied by each expression, which is typically referred
to as the dynamic aggregate demand (DAD) curve. Notably, these DAD-curves were
directly derived from the IS–LM equilibrium, while under the standard model they
14 To explain the limited impact of monetary policy on the long-term rate, Adrian et al. (2010) suggest that
a monetary contraction reduces aggregate demand by flattening the spread between the long-term and short-
term interest rate. This decline in the spread then reduces the profitability of bank lending to the real economy,
which leads them to restrict their supply of credit and thereby reduces aggregate demand. Under the bank
funding channel, by contrast, a monetary contraction reduces investment by increasing the bank lending
rate. The fact that the monetary contraction also flattens the interest rate spread actually dampens its negative
impact on aggregate demand, which follows from writing the lending rate as rb = rs + k(r − rs ) + rσ
and observing that it declines as the interest rate spread flattens.
15 Because expected inflation is exogenous in the model, the expression implies a positive relationship
between aggregate demand and the inflation objective π∗. However, if the central bank would adopt a
higher inflation objective this would probably lead to a similar increase in expected inflation, in which case
aggregate demand remains unchanged.
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Fig. 4 Aggregate demand and
expected inflation. Note the
downward sloping line refers to
the standard case where
monetary policy is implemented
according to the Taylor
principle, while the upward
sloping line refers to the case
where the nominal short-term






can only be obtained after dropping the LM-curve and replacing it with a monetary
policy rule. By dropping the LM-curve, however, the DAD-curve that results cannot
be used to analyze the effect of changes in the money supply.
3.2 Banking Sector Money Supply
Our model features an important role for bank equity in determining aggregate demand,
as bank equity determines the supply of money in the economy. We hereby contrast
the earlier view that changes in money supply are driven by monetary policy, which,
as outlined above, is actually executed through changes in the short-term interest rate.




= (1 − sYG)md = YE > 0, (16)
which is unambiguously greater than zero.16 Moreover, if:
1
d/m + s > YG ,
the bank equity multiplier, YE will be larger than the government spending multi-
plier YG . As this inequality holds for all plausible parameter constellations, the model
implies that the bank equity multiplier is larger than the government spending multi-
16 To see this, use YG = edk(b+ f )+es to observe that sYG ∈ (0, 1). Notably, changes in bank equity only
affect aggregate demand as long as the equity requirement in (2) is binding. In practice, a sudden decline of
bank equity during a financial crisis may therefore have a larger impact on aggregate demand than a sudden
increase of bank equity during normal times.
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plier.17 This result implies that for an equivalent increase of government spending and
bank equity, the latter will have a larger impact on aggregate demand than the former.
We obtain the impact of a change in bank equity on the long-term interest rate by





YG < 0, (17)
which is unambiguously negative. An increase in bank equity thus lowers the long-term
interest rate. Observing that (12b) implies that ∂r
∂G = de YG > 0 (see “Appendix”), and
acknowledging that in practice sm > d shows that, in absolute value, changes in bank
equity E have a larger impact on the long-term interest rate than equally large changes
in deficit-financed government spending G. Hence, when compared to fiscal policy,
changes in bank equity have a more pronounced impact both on aggregate demand
and on the long-term interest rate, which highlights that bank equity is a prominent
determinant of equilibrium outcomes. The equilibrium impact of a decline in equity is
displayed in Fig. 5. This effect is qualitatively similar to that of a decline in the money
supply in the original model, in which the money supply is determined by the central
bank.
3.2.1 Extension: Endogenous Equity
Similar to the assumption of exogenous central bank money supply in the standard
model, in our model bank equity and, thereby, banking sector money supply is exoge-
nous. While this facilitates drawing parallels with the standard model, the current
model can be modified to let the money supply be determined endogenously. To do
so we take into account that for the stock of outstanding loans L to be constant in
equilibrium, the flow of newly made loans has to be equal to the flow of maturing
loans that are being repaid. If this were not the case, the bank’s loan portfolio would
either grow in size indefinitely or would over time shrink towards zero. If we set the
flow of maturing loans equal to a fraction a ∈ (0, 1) of the stock of loans L , and if we
take into account that the flow of newly made loans is equal to total investment I , this
intuition can be formalized as:
I = aL . (18)
17 To see this, we note that the condition is less likely to hold for larger values of d, k, and s, but is still
met for implausibly high values of these parameters. For instance, suppose k is equal to 0.1, which is
substantially higher than the Basel III regulatory leverage requirement of 0.03. Furthermore, assume d is
equal to 1, which is considerably larger than the ratio of broad money (M3) to GDP in the U.S., which
lies between 0.5 and 0.65 (FRED 2015). Finally, the worldwide average savings rate equals 0.21 (World
Bank 2015), which if equated to the marginal savings rate 1 − c implies that s ≡ 1 − c − i is considerably
below this number. Setting s considerably higher at 0.3 shows that the equality holds for any YG ≤ 2.4,
which is well above the 1.7 that Blanchard and Leigh (2013) suggest as the upper bound for the government
spending multiplier worldwide. For any less extreme values for k, d and s, the cut-off value for YG is even
higher.
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Using the investment function in (10) and the bank equity requirement in (2), this
expression can be rewritten as an expression for E , which can then be substituted in
(8) to obtain a version of the LM-curve with endogenous equity:
Y = ae − (1 − k)kb
ad − (1 − k)i (r − rs) −
(1 − k)b
ad − (1 − k)i (rs + rσ ). (19)
The “Appendix” proves that ae > (1 − k)kb if we assume that i < ad1−k [in addition
to the assumption i < 1 − c made under (5)], which ensures that aggregate demand
is positive and the LM-curve slopes upward. The money market equilibrium then
implies that a monetary contraction has a negative effect on aggregate demand, while
as a new result it shows that an increase in the risk premium has such a negative effect
as well. Note that by endogenizing the banking sector’s supply of money, the model’s
equilibrium depends on real variables only (see also footnote 10). This allows us to
drop the (so far implicit) assumption from the standard model that the nominal money
supply can be deflated using a constant price level.
The IS-curve in (11) remains the same as before, as it does not depend on bank
equity. Hence, endogenizing bank equity only affects the comparative statics of the
model to the extent that it changes the comparative statics of the LM-curve. The
“Appendix” shows that in equilibrium, these comparative statics are qualitatively
unchanged as aggregate demand and the long-term interest rate still depend posi-
tively on government spending and negatively on the risk-premium. Also, aggregate
demand depends negatively on the short-term interest rate while the impact thereof
on the long-term rate remains ambiguous. As the model with endogenous equity is
somewhat less tractable than the one where equity is exogenous, we focus on the case
of exogenous bank equity for the remainder of the paper.
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3.3 Zero Lower Bound Versus Liquidity Trap
By letting the central bank control the short-term interest rate while the banking sector
supplies the quantity of money, the model allows to highlight the distinction between
the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap. The zero lower bound affects contemporary
monetary policy, as it concerns the situation that once the nominal short-term interest
rate has hit zero, it is no longer feasible to decrease it any further. After all, once
the nominal short-term rate arrives at zero, a further decline would cause savers to
withdraw their bank deposits and hoard cash instead.18 As the nominal short-term
rate equals is ≡ rs + πe, the zero lower bound can be defined as the constraint that
rs ≥ −πe. Although a conventional monetary expansion is infeasible at the zero lower
bound, the other properties of the model remain unaffected. That is, setting rs = −πe
in (12a) and (12b) does not change how aggregate demand and the long-term interest
rate are determined. As we will see, the zero lower bound in this way differs markedly
from a liquidity trap.
Indeed, our analysis sheds new light on the liquidity trap and its impact on the
efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy. In a liquidity trap an expansion of the money
supply, which in our model results from an increase in bank equity E , is fully absorbed
by an increase in money demand without lowering the interest rate on savings and
investment. Aggregate demand therefore remains unchanged. Typically, e.g., Eggerts-
son (2008), this situation is associated with monetary policy being at the zero lower
bound, as is illustrated by Krugman (1998) observation that “a liquidity trap may be
defined as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impo-
tent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero”. However, our model shows
that both concepts differ markedly from each other. In particular, the economy is in a
liquidity trap when r = rs , as a further decline of r then is infeasible because savers
would start selling bank equity and hoard bank deposits. As the traditional IS–LM
model implicitly assumes that rs = 0, because the only short-term asset available
is cash with its interest rate of zero, the liquidity trap coincides with the zero lower
bound. However, by allowing for interest bearing bank deposits, our model shows that
the liquidity trap can also occur for interest rates larger than zero. In particular, the
liquidity trap can be interpreted as a zero lower bound on the term-premium, stating
that r − rs ≥ 0.19
The above implies that at r = rs the LM-curve becomes horizontal, which just
as in the traditional model can be achieved by letting e = ∞ in (8). A change in
the money supply through a change in E then no longer affects aggregate demand or
the long-term interest rate. Furthermore, viewing the government spending multiplier
18 In practice, due to the costs involved in safely storing large volumes of cash, the return on holding cash
is somewhat lower than zero. As a result, the lower bound on nominal short-term interest rates is somewhat
lower than zero as well, a consideration that we abstain from in the model for reasons of simplicity. For
further reading on the role of cash and other aspects of the zero lower bound, see Ball et al. (2016).
19 In practice, just as the lower bound on nominal interest rates is somewhat below zero, the lower bound
on the term-premium could be somewhat below zero as well. Still, the 10-year term-premium on U.S.
Treasuries that is estimated by the New York Fed, which uses the methodology by Adrian et al. (2013), has
been negative for less than 4% of the time since the beginning of the 1960s. See https://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/data_indicators/term_premia.html.
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Fig. 6 Aggregate demand and
expected inflation at the zero
lower bound and in the liquidity
trap. Note the continuous
downward sloping line refers to
the standard case where
monetary policy is implemented
according to the Taylor
principle, while the continuous
upward sloping line refers to the
case where the nominal
short-term interest rate is at the
zero lower bound. The dotted
lines refer to the same cases but








YG = edk(b+ f )+es confirms the conventional wisdom that a fiscal expansion becomes
particularly potent in a liquidity trap—having an impact on aggregate demand equal to
1/s. At the same time, with the LM-curve being flat there is no impact of fiscal policy
on the long-term interest rate. More surprisingly, also the impact of monetary policy
on aggregate demand is enhanced, in tandem with the impact of fiscal policy as (13) is
a fixed multiple of the government spending multiplier. In addition, as r = rs implies
that rb = rs + rσ , a chang of the monetary policy rate in a liquidity trap translates into
a one-for-one adjustment of all other interest rates in the model.
The differences between the zero lower bound and of the liquidity trap carry over
to the relationship between aggregate demand and expected inflation. For example,
once the zero lower bound causes the nominal short-term interest rate to be stuck at
the zero, the central bank can no longer implement the Taylor principle discussed in
Sect. 3.1.2. Figure 6 shows that this causes the DAD-curve to slope downward instead
of upward [as for a constant nominal short-term interest rate the curve is determined
by (15a)]. This dynamic aggregate demand curve is similar to the ‘topsy-turvy’ one
analyzed in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). By contrast, as Fig. 6 also illustrates, the
liquidity trap causes the slope of the DAD-curve to flatten rather than to change sign
[this follows from substituting e = ∞ in (15a) and in (15b)]. This flatter slope reflects
that in a liquidity trap the real short-term interest rate is equal to the real long-term
interest rate. A change in expected inflation therefore affects the real long-term interest
rate in the same way as the real short-term interest rate, which strengthens the impact
of the change in expected inflation on aggregate demand. As the figure illustrates, if
the monetary policy interest rate arrives at the zero lower bound or if the economy
moves into a liquidity trap, the relationship between aggregate demand and expected
inflation changes considerably.
Summarizing, compared to the zero lower bound, which hinders monetary policy
by imposing a constraint rs ≥ −πe on the short-term interest rate, the liquidity trap
imposes a constraint r ≥ rs on the long-term interest rate (i.e., a zero lower bound on
the term premium) and causes the efficacy of both fiscal and (conventional) monetary
policy to be enhanced. Figure 7 illustrates for the U.S. that monetary policy may be
at the zero lower bound while the term-premium is larger than zero, and vice versa.
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Fig. 7 The zero lower bound and the liquidity trap. Note the black line displays the U.S. Federal Funds rate
as obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The gray line displays the 10-year term-premium
in U.S. Treasuries as obtained from the New York Federal Reserve
Hence, the zero lower bound and the liquidity trap are distinct concepts with both their
own consequences. Notably, the common view that a liquidity trap renders monetary
policy powerless hinges crucially on the assumption that this policy is implemented
through changing the money supply, and vanishes when taking into account that central
bank monetary policy involves changing the short-term interest rate.
3.3.1 IS–LM and IS–MP as Special Cases
A direct implication of the foregoing discussion is that our models nests the IS–LM
model as well the IS–MP model as special cases.20 Indeed, the IS–LM model can
be seen as a special case of our model when monetary policy is at the zero lower
bound, while Romer’s (2000) IS–MP model can be seen as a special case when the
economy is in a liquidity trap. To obtain the traditional IS–LM model, let the risk
premium rσ and (exogenous) inflation expectations πe both be equal to zero. The zero
lower bound on the nominal short-term interest rate then implies rs = 0. In this case,
aggregate demand in (12a) and the long-term interest rate in (12b) only depend on
government deficit spending G and on the supply of money m E = Ms , in a way that
is observationally equivalent to the standard IS–LM framework. The IS–MP model,
in addition, is obtained when the economy in our model is in a liquidity trap, i.e.,
when e = ∞. The equilibrium is then described by the IS-curve in (11) while the
long-term interest rate in (12b) reads r = rs . Assuming a monetary policy rule for
20 As an alternative to the IS–LM model, Romer (2000) develops the IS–MP model by replacing the
LM-curve with a monetary policy rule such as the one by Taylor (1993).
123
A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate Demand 227
rs then yields the IS–MP model. Hence, our model generalizes both the IS–LM and
the IS–MP model, as it applies also when the economy is not at the zero lower bound
or in a liquidity trap and irrespective of whether the central bank follows a specific
monetary policy rule.
4 The Global Financial Crisis
Using the insights collected above we now apply our model to the 2007 Global Finan-
cial Crisis (GFC) and the ensuing recession. We structure the analysis by distinguishing
between (i) the run-up to the crisis, (ii) the outbreak of the crisis, (iii) the policy response
to the crisis, and (iv) the aftermath of the crisis. For future reference, Fig. 8 depicts
the main developments in bank equity, GDP growth, and the long-term real interest
rate during these periods, with the shaded area indicating the 2 years following the
crisis outbreak in mid-2007. We adopt this stylized distinction between crisis phases
for narrative purposes and acknowledge that the actual chain of events is less clear-cut.
4.1 Run-Up to the Crisis
The years preceding the 2007 GFC were characterized by a marked increase in bank
risk-taking (e.g., Brunnermeier 2009). Indeed, banks managed to increase their risk
profiles by engaging in off-balance sheet activities that remained largely unregulated.
A notable example is the originate-to-distribute model in which banks transferred
mortgage, car and student loans to the balance sheets of special purposes vehicles.
These entities, which were not subject to banking regulation, held almost no equity
buffers and financed themselves by issuing short-term debt. These debt instruments
provided their buyers with an important source of money as they could be traded
easily in financial markets. By boosting profitability, the originate-to-distribute model
contributed to an exceptionally large increase in the total value of bank equity. The
MSCI World Banking Index rose by 65% between 2000 and its in peak in May 2007,
while the MSCI World Index as a whole only increased by 15% in the same period—a
50% point difference.
Within our framework, higher bank risk taking can be modeled as a reduction
in bank equity requirements k (which is effectively what happens if an increasing
share of banks’ loans is held on the balance sheet of unregulated entities). As we
show in the “Appendix” lower equity requirements boost aggregate demand, amongst
others because they allow banks to supply more money for an equal amount of equity.
Furthermore, the increase in bank equity values can be interpreted as an increase in
E within our model. As is borne out by Sect. 3.2, this provides a strong (i.e., larger
than an equivalent change in government expenditures) boost to aggregate demand
and depresses the long-term interest rate.
The above discussion suggests an additional explanation for the secular decline in
the long-term interest rate in the run up to the GFC. In their statements before the
U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Bernanke (2010) and Greenspan (2010)
attribute this decline to an increase in savings relative to investments—especially in
emerging markets. In addition, the IMF (2014) considers increased demand for safe
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Fig. 8 Macroeconomic developments. Note the top panel displays the MSCI World Banking Equity Index
and includes the MSCI World Equity Index for comparison. The middle panel displays growth per decade
of global real GDP per capita, obtained from the World Bank’s Global Development Indicators. The lower
panel displays the long-term real interest rate, measured as the 10-year yield on inflation-indexed triple-A
U.K. treasury bills (which is available for a longer time period than similar statistics for the U.S.). The
shaded area comprises the 2-year period starting mid-2007
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assets to have been an important factor, and also explores the potential contribution
of fiscal and monetary policy. Supplementing these views, our model suggests that
part of the decline in long-term rates may have been driven by an increase in bank
money supply made possible by rising bank equity values. These high equity values for
instance enabled banks to issue increasing amounts of liquid asset backed securities,
which may have depressed the long-term interest rate similar to the effect of a money
supply expansion in the standard model.21
4.2 Outbreak of the Crisis
The 2007 GFC was triggered by the realization that U.S. house prises had become
unsustainably high and that, therefore, U.S. mortgage backed securities were worth
substantially less than initially thought. This became increasingly clear in June 2007
when investment bank Bear Stearns needed to bail out two of its hedge funds that
were heavily exposed to the U.S. housing market. Financial turmoil continued as bank
equity values fell, the market for asset backed securities became illiquid, and Lehman
Brothers, another investment bank, collapsed in September 2008. It was not before the
first half of 2009 that banks’ equity values started to show some upward movement
again.
Within our model the outbreak of the crisis can be seen as a sharp drop in bank
equity E combined with an increase in k as investors are only willing to finance banks
with relatively high equity buffers (a ‘wake-up call’). In addition, the illiquidity of the
market for asset backed securities forced banks to take these securities out of their
special purpose vehicles and put them back on their own balance sheets, where they
became subject to (higher) regulatory equity requirements.22 As before, the impact of a
decline in E can be analyzed with reference to Fig. 5, which highlights the sharp decline
in aggregate demand after a decline in bank equity. This decline in aggregate demand
is further aggravated by the increase of k. In addition, the drop in E contributes to an
increase in the long-term interest rate. Hence, by means of the bank equity multiplier
YE derived above, we can go some way in rationalizing why a decline in bank equity
could have had a large impact on aggregate demand displayed in the middle panel of
Fig. 8. In addition, the sudden decline in bank equity after the Lehman collapse was
associated with a drastic reduction of bank money supply, which would cause a strong
increase of the long-term interest rate as in the lower panel of the figure.
21 The upward trend in private sector money supply as a percentage of GDP dates back to the beginning
of the 1980s, which coincides with the start of the downward trend in long-term interest rates: https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=cM5p. The discussion of the interest rate conundrum in Sect. 3.1 highlights why
monetary policy was ineffective in offsetting the decline in long-term interest rates, even though it probably
had a dampening effect on aggregate demand.
22 See also Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) for an analysis of a sudden exogenous decline in the acceptable
level of leverage—a so-called Minsky moment.
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4.3 Policy Response to the Crisis
In response to the turmoil in financial markets, the Federal Reserve started to lower the
Federal Funds Target Rate in September 2007. After initially reducing the Target Rate
by 50 basis points, the Federal Reserve steadily reduced the rate further, eventually
hitting the zero lower bound in December 2008. In tandem with the actions of the Fed-
eral Reserve, also the European Central Bank and the Bank of England both reduced
their Target Rates, eventually hitting the zero lower bound as well. In spite of these
large and concerted monetary expansions, the international banking sector remained
notoriously unstable. Hence, in order to restore stability, policy makers required banks
to recapitalize either by forcing them to withhold dividends or by issuing new shares,
and in several cases bailed them out altogether (e.g., Northern Rock, ABN-Amro, and
Citigroup).
The unprecedented reductions in monetary policy rates can be analysed in our model
as a decline in the short-term interest rate rs . Section 3.1 reveals that this causes and
outward shift of both the LM and IS-curve leading to upward pressure on aggregate
demand and to an ambiguous impact on the long-term interest rate. Once the policy
rate hit the zero lower bound, the alternative option for policy makers was to provide
large scale direct support to the banking sector. Such support occurred through asset
purchases and guarantees but also very explicitly through bank bailouts.23 Within our
model this can be considered as a direct transfer from the government to the banking
sector to increase their equity E . In principle, in order to restore aggregate demand
through a bailout, the size of the bailout should equal the amount of equity lost during
the crisis, hence neutralizing the effect. However, as the crisis triggered bank financiers
to demand higher equity buffers than before, the actual bail out necessary is larger
than the equity loss incurred during the crisis. Still, it is much smaller than the increase
in government expenditure that would be required to restore aggregate demand using
a conventional fiscal expansion (see the discussion in Sect. 3.2). Bank bailouts may
thus be a particularly powerful tool for restoring aggregate demand in the wake of a
financial crisis.24
The above discussion sheds new light on why the drastic reduction of monetary
policy rates toward the zero lower bound was unlikely to be large enough to prevent
a marked shortfall in economic activity. While fiscal consolidations are sometimes
presented as culprits for the decline in aggregate demand, depressed bank equity
values are likely to have contributed to such a decline as well. In fact, even by the
start of 2015, despite several bank recapitalization rounds, bank equity values were
still 46% below their pre-crisis peak, while since then the MSCI World stock market
index experienced a growth of 6%. Figure 9 illustrates that this decline in equity values
coincided with a fall in the issuance of asset backed securities, which were typically
23 As reserve requirements are absent, our model does not have a role for the increase in reserves supplied
by central banks to stabilize the financial sector. This is in line with Kydland and Prescott (1990) observation
that central banks at all times provide any desired amount of reserves to the financial sector. In that sense,
Footnote 23 continued
the promise by central banks after the Lehman collapse to provide unlimited reserves to the banking sector
simply confirms normal policy.
24 Naturally, the moral hazard implications of both policies are quite different.
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Fig. 9 Issuance of asset backed securities. Note the black bars display the issuance of asset backed securities
in the United States and the gray bars display issuance in the European Union. Issuance volumes are
expressed in billions of euros and are obtained from the 2017Q4 Securitisation Data Snapshot published
by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe
regarded as money-like debt instruments due to their perceived safety and liquidity.
Our model implies that the relatively quick recovery of issuance volumes in the U.S.,
as compared to issuance in the European Union, was at least partially enabled by the
swifter recapitalization of U.S. banks after the crisis.
4.4 Aftermath of the Crisis
The slow recovery after the GFC not only reflects a decline in bank money supply
but has also been attributed to depressed credit growth. While to some extent lower
credit supply was a correction of pre-crisis excesses, policy makers worried that a
credit crunch could impede the economic recovery. Hence, in November 2008, the
Federal Reserve announced that it would start buying U.S. mortgage backed securities
in financial markets in order to boost credit availability—the so-called credit easing
program. Since then, the Federal Reserve accumulated over 1.5 trillion dollars worth
of mortgage backed securities, which has contributed substantially to the decline of
U.S. mortgage rates (Hancock and Passmore 2011). In addition, in March 2009 the
Federal Reserve expanded the program by buying what would end up to be 2.5 trillion
worth of U.S. Treasury securities so as to combat sliding inflation expectations—the
so called quantitative easing program. Likewise, the European Central Bank and the
Bank of England adopted similar policies.
Our model can be used to analyze a credit crunch by focusing on the risk pre-
mium rσ and on inflation expectations πe, the latter of which were introduced in
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Sect. 3.1. The risk premium may have risen once the crisis alerted shareholders that
bank loan portfolios are riskier then they thought, or once declining asset values trigger
an increase in the market price of risk. Such an increase in the risk premium causes
the IS-curve to shift inward, which lowers both aggregate demand and the long-term
interest rate. In fact, the impact on aggregate demand of an increase in risk premiums
is as large as the impact of a comparable increase in the short-term interest rate (see
the “Appendix”). In addition, with monetary policy stuck at the zero lower bound,
the relationship between aggregate demand and expected inflation became positive,
so that the decline in aggregate demand was associated with a decline in expected
inflation.
The above discussion helps to understand the slow recovery in the aftermath of the
crisis. The observed increase in risk premiums rσ is likely to have depressed aggregate
demand as well as the long-term interest rate. The observed decline in long-term rates
should thus not be automatically interpreted as evidence that bank lending rates came
down as well, but could signal that lending rates increased due to higher risk premiums
(see also Daly 2016). At the same time, the decline in aggregate demand may have
caused expected inflation to fall, which with monetary policy stuck at the zero lower
bound implies an increase in the real short-term interest rate.25 To the extent that
central banks’ large scale asset purchases offset the increase in risk premiums and
the decline in inflation expectations, these purchases contributed to raising aggregate
demand.26
5 Conclusion
A caveat of the recent surge of interest in understanding the role of banks in the
macro-economy is the complexity of the modeling frameworks available. Indeed,
various observers have pointed out that state of the art macroeconomic models can be
too complicated for even the sophisticated reader to grasp the essence of economic
policy making. The present paper therefore complements the literature by integrating a
banking sector in a descriptive macroeconomic model that is accessible to the broader
academic community as well as to informed policy makers. Our starting point was
the aggregate demand set-up, which is known for its “principal virtue […] that many
students and policy makers with little or no previous experience can, after some effort,
master its mechanics, understand its intuition, and apply it to novel situations (Romer
2000). What results is a descriptive analytical framework that provides new insights on
developments observed around the Global Financial Crisis. As such, we hope that the
25 The decline in inflation expectations has the same ambiguous effect on the long-term rate as an increase
in the short-term rate rs .
26 An important mechanism through which large scale asset purchases stimulate demand is by buying
assets with longer maturities (i.e., government bonds) in exchange for assets with shorter maturities (i.e.,
central bank deposits). Such purchases lower the long-term interest rate and thereby stimulate aggregate
demand. The present framework cannot analyze this policy, however, as this would require a more explicit
modeling of the balance sheet of the central bank.
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model can assist a broader audience in thinking about the interaction between banking
and aggregate demand.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: Additional Comparative Static Effects
A. Fiscal Policy
The impact on aggregate demand of a change in debt-financed government spending
(i.e., the government spending multiplier), can be assessed by taking the first order




dk (b + f ) + es = YG > 0, (A.1)
which reveals that the efficacy of government spending in changing aggregate demand
is determined by the typical parameters—such as the savings rate s—as well as the
bank equity requirement k. Since the government spending multiplier is positive,
an increase in deficit-financed government spending drives up aggregate demand.
Similarly, to derive the impact of government spending on the long-term interest rate





YG > 0, (A.2)
which shows that an increase in government spending increases the long-term interest
rate.
B. Risk Premium
The impact of a change in the risk premium on aggregate demand equals:
∂Y
∂rσ
= −(b + f )YG < 0, (A.3)




= − (b + f )d
e
YG < 0, (A.4)
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which is negative as well. An increase in the risk premium thus depresses both aggre-
gate demand and the long-term interest rate.
C. Bank Equity Requirements




= Yk < 0, (A.5)
∂r
∂k
= rk  0. (A.6)
Inspection of (A.5) reveals that stricter equity requirements lead to lower aggregate
demand. The impact of a change in equity requirements on the long term interest rate
is analytically ambiguous and depends on the specific parameter constellations.
D. Proof that ae − (1 − k)kb > 0 if i < ad1−k
Using D = (1 − k)L from (7) we know e = dY−(1−k)L
r−rs and from (10) we know
b = iY−I
rb
. Using this we write:
ae − (1 − k)kb = adY
r − rs −
a(1 − k)L
r − rs −
(1 − k)kiY
rb
+ (1 − k)k I
rb
,
= adYrb − (1 − k)kiY (r − rs) − a(1 − k)Lrb + (1 − k)k I (r − rs)
rb(r − rs) ,
= (adrb − (1 − k)ki(r − rs))Y − (rb − k(r − rs))(1 − k)I
rb(r − rs) ,
= (adrb − (1 − k)i(rb − rs − rσ ))Y − (rb − rb + rs + rσ )(1 − k)I
rb(r − rs) ,
= (ad − (1 − k)i)Yrb + [(1 − k)i(rs + rσ )Y − (rs + rσ )(1 − k)I ]
rb(r − rs) ,
= (ad − (1 − k)i)Yrb + (1 − k)(rs + rσ )brb
rb(r − rs) ,
= (ad − (1 − k)i)Y
r − rs +
(rs + rσ )(1 − k)b
r − rs . (A.7)
where we used I = aL in the third row and rb = rs + k(r − rs) + rσ in the fourth.
Focusing on the last row, the first term is positive by our assumption i < ad1−k , while
the second term is positive as well. This proves that ae − (1 − k)kb > 0 if i < ad1−k .
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E. Equilibrium with Endogenous Equity
The equilibrium with endogenous equity is given by the intersection between the IS-
curve in (11) and the LM-curve in (19). Solving for Y and r , respectively, provides:
Y = e˜
d˜k (b + f ) + e˜s
(
G − (b + f )
(
1 + (1 − k)kb
e˜
)




d˜k (b + f ) + e˜s
(
G − (b + f )
(
1 + (1 − k)kb
e˜
)




where e˜ = ae − (1 − k)kb > 0 and d˜ = ad − (1 − k)i > 0. As before, aggregate
demand and the long-term interest rate depend positively on government spending and
negatively on the risk-premium. The short-term interest rate, furthermore, negatively
affects aggregate demand and has an ambiguous impact on the long-term interest rate.
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